IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report Presentation Miscalculated the Emissions for 2C of Warming

In a previous post I mistakenly claimed that the Ladybird Book on Climate Change (lead author HRH The Prince of Wales) had incorrectly interpreted the AR5 IPCC Synthesis Report in its egg-timer. It is the IPCC that is at fault.
In 2014 the IPCC produced a simplified presentation of 35 slides to summarize the AR5 Synthesis Report Summary for policy makers. A quick summary of a summary of the synthesis report.

Slide 30 on Limiting Temperature Increase to 2C, clearly states that it is global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that are needed.

The Ladybird egg-timer is adapted from slide 33 of 35.

As a (slightly manic) beancounter I like to reconcile the figures. How are the 1900 GtCO2 and the 1000 GtCO2 arrived at? It could be that it is GtCO2e, like the throughout the synthesis report, where other greenhouse gases are recast in terms of CO2, which accounts for well over half of the warming from trace gases.

Some assumptions for my quick calculations.

1. A doubling of CO2 will lead to a warming of 3C. This was the central estimate of the Charney Report 1979 (pdf), along with all five of the UNIPCC assessment reports.
2. If the pre-industrial level of CO2 was 280ppm, the dangerous 2C of warming will be reached at 445ppm. Rounded this is 450ppm.
3. In 2011 the Mauna Loa CO2 level was 391.63 ppm.
4. Using the CDIAC World CO2 emission figures, gives the following figures for billions of tonnes of CO2 to achieve a 1ppm rise in CO2 levelsin the graph below. In the five years to 2011 on average it took 17.02 billion tonnes of CO2 to raise CO2 levels by 1 ppm. Lets round it to 17.

Now some quick calculations.
Start with 280ppm
Add 111.76 (=1900/17) gives 391.76. Pretty close to the CO2 level in 2011 of 391.63ppm
Add 58.82 (=1000/17) gives 450.58. Given rounding, this pretty close to 450ppm.

There are problems with these calculations.

  • The estimate of 17 GtCO2e is on the high side. The World CO2 emissions from the CDIAC National Emissions spreadsheet gives a sum of 1069.68 GtCO2 from 1960 to 2011, against a rise in CO2 of 74.72 ppm. That is 14.3 GtCO2e over the whole period. Since 2011 there has been a drop towards this long-term average.
  • The Ladybird Book, like the UNFCCC at COP21 Paris December 2015 talks about restraining emissions to 1.5C. If a doubling of CO2 leads to 3.000C of warming then going from 280ppm to 401ppm (the average level in 2015) will eventually 1.555C of warming. This is a tacit admission that climate sensitivity is vastly overstated.
  • But the biggest error of all is that CO2 is only the major greenhouse gas (if you forget about water vapour). It might be the majority of the warming impact and two-thirds of emissions, but it is not all the warming impact according to theory. That alone would indicate that climate sensitivity was 2 instead of 3. But actual warming from 1780 to 2011 was less than 1C, against the 1C from CO2 alone if CS=2. That indicates that CS ≈ 1.3. But not all of the warming in the last 230 years has been due to changes in GHG levels. There was also recovery from the Little Ice Age. Worst of all for climate alarmism is the divergence problem. In this century the rate of warming should have increased as the rate of CO2 levels increased, in turn due to an increase in the rate of rise in CO2 emissions. But warming stopped. Even with the impact of a strong El Nino, the rate of warming slowed dramatically.



The IPCC calculated their figures for 1000 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions for 2C of warming based on CO2 being the only greenhouse gas and a doubling of CO2 levels producing 3C of warming. On that basis 401ppm CO2 level should produce >1.5C of warming. Add in other greenhouse gases and we are in for 2C of warming without any more greenhouse gas emissions. It is only if climate sensitivity is much lower is it theoretically possible to prevent 2C of warming by drastically reducing global CO2 emissions. The IPCC, have concocted figures knowing that they do not reconcile back to their assumptions.

The questions arise are (a) where do the cumulative emissions figures come from? and (b) whether the UNIPCCC has copied these blatant errors in the COP processes?

This is an extended version of a comment made a Paul Homewoods’ notalotofpeopleknowthat blog.

Kevin Marshall

Trump is wrong on China Global Warming Hoax but right on the policy consequences


  • Donald Trump’s famous tweet that Global Warming is a Chinese Hoax is false, but the policy implications are correct.

  • Total proposed climate policies under the Paris Agreement will not stop global emissions rising, but the policy aim is to have global emissions falling rapidly after 2020.

  • The Rio Declaration 1992 exempted developing countries from a primary obligation to constrain, let alone reduce, emissions. 

  • By 2012 the exempted countries accounted for 64% of global emissions and over 100% of the global emissions growth since 1990.

  • The exempted, countries will collectively have emissions rising for decades to come.

  • The most efficient policy is a carbon tax, applied globally. But even this is highly inefficient, only working by making fossil fuel use unaffordable to all but the very rich. That is morally unacceptable in developed countries, whilst would stop developing countries developing, likely leading to civil wars.

  • Actual climate mitigation policies are less efficient and more costly than a carbon tax.

  • Pursuing mitigation policies in just the developed countries harms the poor disproportionately and harms manufacturing. Such policies may not even reduce global emissions.

  • Even if catastrophic global warming is true, the policy reality is the same as if it were a hoax. In either case they are net harmful to the policy countries.

  • Like with utterly ineffective drugs that harm the patient, the rational response to climate mitigation policies is to ban them.



President-elect Donald Trump infamously claimed on Twitter

The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.

I believe that statement to be totally false. The Chinese had nothing (or essentially nothing) to do with the climate alarmism that the Western intelligentsia (especially in the Anglosphere) seem to religiously accept as a series of a priori truths. But the policy implications of believing such a false position are pretty much the same for a policy-maker that (a) accepts as truth catastrophic global warming hypothesis, (b) puts their country first (but still values highly people in other countries, with an emphasis on the poor and the oppressed) (c) but understands the realities of global policy-making, along with the full economic impact of mitigation policy.

The Realities of Actual Mitigation Policy

The hypothesis is the basic form is that global human greenhouse gas emissions (mostly CO2) are resulting in rising greenhouse gas levels. This is forecast to cause large increases in global average temperatures, which in turn, many believe, will be catastrophic to the climate system. The major policy is to reduce the global greenhouse gas emissions to near zero.
The UNIPCC AR5 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers 2014 tried to the maths very simple. They only looked at CO2 for the ballpark figures. Using the central assumption of a doubling of CO2 gives 3 degrees of warming, then 2 degrees comes when CO2 levels hit 450ppm. At end of 2016 it levels were about 404ppm, and rising at over 2ppm per year. Only is some warming from other greenhouse gases, so we are well beyond the 420ppm. That gives maybe 15 years tops. Somehow though figures seem to have been stretched a bit to give more time, something I will look at in a later post.
The UNFCCC – the body that brings all the countries together to cut emissions to save the planet – had an all-out bash at COP21 Paris in December 2015. In the lead-up all countries (excluding the EU countries, who let the masters in Brussels take the lead) made submissions on how they would contribute towards saving the world, or at least make a start up to 2030. Many were so vague, it was difficult to decipher the “ambition”. This was done to appear like the countries were doing something substantial, when in fact the proposals were often so insubstantial, that targets could be achieved by doing nothing at all. The UNFCCC put all the INDC submissions together on a global emissions graph.

The graph is very simple. Before the INDCs, emissions were forecast to follow the thin dark orange arrow. With the INDCs, the thick light orange forecast is still tracking upwards in 2030. The least-cost 2C scenarios is the blue arrow. This is going down by 2020, and by 2030 is substantially lower than today. The graph gives a very clear message – the whole exercise is pretty much an expensive waste of time. 40,000 people attended the meeting at Le Bourget airport North of Paris, including the vast majority of World Leaders. Rather than be honest, they went through the usual format with a breakthrough at five past midnight. Then they sent the “experts” away to think up yet more scary scenarios to get better proposals in the future.


Little More Policy will be Forthcoming

If they actually read the 1992 Rio Declaration, like Robin Guenier did in October 2015, they would have found out why. In particular Guenier draws attention to this statement in the declaration.

“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention … will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.” [My emphasis]

These non-Annex 1 developing countries have had phenomenal economic growth, with driven by rapid development of cheap energy from fossil fuels. Guenier quotes some CO2 emissions figures. Instead, I have used the broader estimates of greenhouse gas emissions from the European Commissions’ EDGAR database, grouping the figures into the Annex I countries (the rich OECD countries, like the USA, Japan, European Union, Canada, Australia etc.); the Annex I Transitional economies (basically the ex-Soviet bloc in Europe); International air and shipping; and the Non-Annex, rest of the world.

The figures are quite clear. The growth in emissions in 22 years was greater in the Non-Annex developing countries than the world as a whole. But this is just the developing countries starting to catch up. The breakdown of the Non-Annex developing county emissions is below.

This “developing” part of the world now has 84% of the global population, but in 2012 was just 64% of the greenhouse gas emissions. India and China each have more than 4 times the population of the USA, Africa 3.5 times and S&E Asia 3 times. Whilst in China emissions growth will peak soon, in India emissions growth is only recently taken off.  In S&E Asia and Africa emissions growth has yet to really take off. No matter what the USA and a few other developed countries do, it will not make a big difference to the long-term outlook for GHG emissions. Now compare the global emissions to the UNFCCC graph of INDCs of the target emissions reductions for 2030. The UNFCCC scale is in billions of tonnes, whilst the scale I use is in millions. The least cost 2C scenario is lower in 2040 that the total non-Annex countries in 2012. Even without emissions growth in the non-Annex countries, the Annex countries could cut emissions by 100% and still the 2C limit will be breached by the 84% who live in countries with no obligation to cut their emissions.
But maybe the USA should cut emissions anyway? After all it will not cost much, so these developing nations will be brought into line. I only recently realized how wrong this view was. Economics Prof Richard Tol it one of the World’s leading climate economists, who (unlike me) happens to believe in the moral case for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. In a recent paper, “The Structure of the Climate Debate”, Tol explained how a global carbon tax was theoretically the most efficient means to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Use regulation, or rationing, or subsidies of renewables, and it will be more expensive – less bang for your bucks. However, I objected. He seemed to be saying that the carbon tax necessary to cut global emissions worked out at less than the taxation on gasoline in Britain. At over $3 (a level that is similar in much of Europe) there are still quite high levels of fuel usage. I can still remember my high school economics teacher, in teaching about elasticity of demand, said that a good example of inelastic demand were the “sin” taxes on booze, alcohol, tobacco and petrol (gasoline). You could have quite high taxes without impacting on demand. Well, after a few exchanges at cliscep blog turns out Tol (in the more technical Tol 2013 paper) was recommending a $210 tCO2 tax to be imposed in 2020 globally, plus an escalator of 5.5% a year forever. It would eventually make fossil-fuelled energy use unaffordable to all but the Hollywood A-listers. I showed British readers in GBP would that would mean, but for the US readers $210tCO2 is about $1.83 per gallon of gasoline. There would be uproar if it was introduced, and people might get more fuel efficient cars. With the escalator that would rise to over $3 a gallon in 2030, $9 2050, $35 in 2075 and$132 a gallon in 2100. There would also be similar hikes in electricity from coal and gas. This might not be fast enough to achieve the reductions required by the UNFCCC, but would not be sustainable in a country with democratic elections every few years.

But actual climate mitigation policies, are far less effective that the carbon tax. This includes subsidies or loan guarantees to speculative and unsustainable businesses, or flash renewable technologies that fail to deliver,

The carbon tax might be harmful to the poor and middle classes in America, but think of what it would do to the living standards of the poorest half of the world. Countries where parents are hoping that their children might enjoy cheap energy for cooking, lighting or heating, would see those hopes dashed. For billions of people their children or grandchildren would never have a family car, or be able to travel by plane. If the Governments of India, China or Indonesia tried to impose such high and escalating taxes there could be economic collapse similar to that of Greece, and likely civil wars.

Should the Rich countries still do something?

So maybe the United States, and other rich countries, should still adopt policies regardless. After all, they should pay for the (alleged) harms that are leading to disaster. But if the proposers had any understanding of the real world, they would know that just as economic growth has been propelled by abundant supplies of cheap, available and reliable energy. In international trade what is “cheap” is a relative concept. In the nineteenth century steam power was very expensive compared to electricity today. But at this point in time, when developing countries are make power more available and driving their unit energy costs down. Steam power was much cheaper, and more available than water power, which in turn was cheaper than human or animal power. Yet implementing emissions reduction policies, the rich countries are driving those unit energy costs up just as developing countries have been driving unit energy costs down and making power more available. The USA and EU countries are generating a comparative disadvantage. But, as the developed nations tend to be more energy efficient, the net effect on global emissions may be to increase them, despite the policy countries decreasing theirs. That net effect is unlikely to be as large as any actual savings in the policy countries. What is more, the costs of policy will fall on the poor, and those areas of employment with high energy usage and that compete internationally.

An argument for climate mitigation is that it is to make small sacrifices now to save future generations from the much larger costs of future catastrophic climate change. That is only true if global emissions are cut significantly, at a cost lower than the actual harmful impacts that would have occurred without policy. As policy to cut emissions will makes very little difference to global emissions, then the sacrifices could be of a small benefit in non-policy countries, but be to the net disadvantage of future generations in the policy countries. The biggest burden of the costs of policy will fall on the poorer sections of society and manufacturing in the policy countries.

The Moral Case Against Climate Mitigatiom

If the medical profession insisted on patients taking drugs that did not work and had harmful side effects, then in litigious America they would be sued for all they had, and likely jailed. But when the climate alarmists, back by the liberal establishment, insist on policy that cannot work and causes substantial harms they are not held to account. Indeed, so pervasive are the beliefs in climate alarmism, it is an act of heresy to even question this false policy. Now the tables are turned.

The first thing that should be done with harmful drugs that cannot work is to ban them from sale. For an incoming President, the first thing to do with harmful and useless policies is to rescind them.

Kevin Marshall


Friends of the Earth distorting the evidence for Fracking in the UK


Friends of the Earth have a webpage claiming to be “fracking facts”. The key points I make are.

  • The claims of dangers of fracking raise questions, that need to be answered before they can be considered credible.
  • The claim that fracking could affect house prices is totally unsupported.
  • The claim that shale gas will not significantly affect energy prices is based on out of date data. The British Geological Survey has shown that the potential of shale gas is huge. Friends of the Earth has played a major role in preventing that potential being realized.
  • FoE has consequently helped prevent shale gas from relieving the energy crisis brought upon by the Climate Change Act 2008.
  • Claims that pursuing shale gas in Britain will affect global emissions are pure fantasy. Also is a fantasy the belief that Britain is leading the way on emissions reductions. We ain’t leading if collectively the world is not following. The evidence shows clearly shows this.  

In the previous post I looked at how FoE blatantly mislead about an agreement they reached with the Advertising Standards Authority, which caused the unusual step of ASA Chief Executive Guy Parker issuing a strongly worded statement to defend the ASA’s integrity.

In this post I will look at FoE’s position on fracking, from Fracking definition? What does fracking mean? Read our fracking facts

I will look at various statements made (with FoE quotes in purple), showing how well they are supported by the evidence and/or providing alternative perspectives.

From the section What are the dangers of fracking?

Industry statistics from North America show that around 6% of fracking wells leak immediately.

Leaking wells lead to a risk of water contamination. Lord Smith, former chair of the Environment Agency, has said this is the biggest risk posed by fracking.

So it’s particularly concerning that the Government has now said it will allow fracking companies to drill through aquifers which provide household drinking water.

This raises some questions.

  • If leaks are a problem, with respect to fracking in the UK has this been risk assessed, with appropriate measures taken to prevent leaks?
  • Does that statistic of 6% allow for when there is natural leakage in the area of fracking leaking in the water supplies are venting into the atmosphere in the area where fracking is occurring? This was the case in the images of the flaming water faucet in the movie Gasland.
  • Have there been steps taken in the USA to reduce genuine leaks?
  • Has the proportion of wells leaking gas in the USA been increasing or decreasing?
  • Has the average amount of gas leaked been increasing or decreasing?
  • How when extracting gas from well below water aquifers, through a lined tube, that is both water-tight and gas-tight, is that gas (and fracking fluids) meant to leech into the water supply?

Then there is the statement without evidence.

Fracking could also affect house prices.

This was one of the issues FoE in its agreement with the ASA have the assurance not to repeat claims that fracking affects property prices, unless the evidence changes. Legally there might be cop-out where that assurance does not apply to claims made on its website. Literally, the statement is not untrue, just as the claim that a butterfly flapping its wings on the North Downs could lead to a typhoon in the South China Sea.

Would fracking bring down energy bills?

It’s very unlikely. Fracking company Cuadrilla has admitted that any impact on bills would be “basically insignificant”.

Claims that fracking would create a lot of jobs have also been overstated. According to Cuadrilla, each of its proposed 6-year projects in Lancashire that were recently rejected by the council would only have created 11 jobs.

The claim about Cuadrilla is sourced from an Independent article in June 2013.

“We’ve done an analysis and it’s a very small…at the most it’s a very small percentage…basically insignificant,” said Mark Linder, a public relations executive at Bell Pottinger who is also responsible for Cuadrilla’s corporate development.

The article later says

“According to Poyry, Lancashire shale gas production could also reduce the country’s wholesale gas and electricity prices by as much as 4 per cent between 2014 and 2035, which corresponds to an average saving of £810m/year,”

It is not surprising that shale gas developments in Lancashire alone will not have a significant impact on UK energy prices, especially if that is restricted to a few sites by one company. But over three years later the landscape has changed. The British Geological Survey has been publishing estimates of the quantities of shale gas (and oil) that exists beneath the ground.

The figures are at first hard to comprehend. Large number in units of measure that ordinary people (even people with some knowledge of the field) are unfamiliar are hard to comprehend, let alone put into some perspective. In my view, the figures need to be related to annual British consumption. Page 8 of the DECC UK Energy Statistics, 2015 & Q4 2015 estimates gas demand at 794 TWh in 2015.

The BGS uses tcf (tera cubic feet) for its’ estimates, which (like a domestic gas bill) can be converted from TWh. The 794 TWh is about 2.7 tcf. Not all shale gas is recoverable. In fact possibly only 10% of reserves is recoverable on existing technology, and depending on the quality of the deposits.

There are also shale oil deposits, measured by the BGS in both barrels and millions of tonnes. Refinery production (a rough estimate of consumption) was 63 millions of tonnes in 2015. I will again assume 10% recovery.

The biggest shock was published just a few weeks after the Independent article on 27th July 2013. The size of the Bowland shale was truly staggering. The central estimate is 1329 tcf, meaning enough to satisfy 49 years of current UK gas demand. Potentially it is more, due to the depth of deposits in many areas. No significant deposits of oil are thought to be present

On 23rd May 2014 BGS published the results for the Weald Basin, a large area in the South East of England. Whilst there were no significant deposits of gas, the central estimate of 591 million tonnes is enough to supply the UK for one year.

On 25 June 2014 the Welsh Government published the estimates for Wales. The main gas deposits are thought to be in Wrexham/Cheshire and in South Wales and estimated about 65 tcf, or just over two years of UK demand. (Strictly the Welsh estimate is somewhat below this, as Wrexham is on the Welsh border and Cheshire is an English county. )

On 23rd May 2014 BGS published the results for the Midland Valley of Scotland. The central estimate for shale gas was 80.3 tcf (3 years of UK demand) and for shale oil 800 million tonnes (15 months of refinery production).

Most recently on 13th October 2016, BGS published the results for the Jurassic shale of the Wessex area. Central estimate for shale oil was 149 million tonnes, equivalent to three months of UK refinery production.

In all, conservatively there is estimated to be sufficient gas to supply the UK for over 54 years and oil for two and half years. The impact on supply, and therefore the impact on jobs and (in the case of gas) on energy prices, demands on the ability of businesses to profitability develop these resources. As has happened in the USA, the impact on jobs is mostly dependent on the impact on prices, as low prices affect other industries. In the USA, industries that are sensitive to energy prices (or use gas as a raw material) have returned from overseas, boosting jobs. FoE has played no small part in delaying planning applications with spurious arguments, along with generating false fears that could have made regulations more onerous than if an objective assessment of the risks had been made.

Fracking can’t help any short term or medium term energy crisis.

Even if the industry was able to move ahead as fast as it wants, we wouldn’t see significant production until about 2025.

This is actually true and up to date. If it were not for the Climate Change Act along with eco-activists blocking every move to meet the real energy demands in the most affordable and efficient way possible, there would be no prospective energy crisis. In terms of shale gas meeting energy demands (and gas-fired power stations being built) FoE should claim some of the credit for preventing the rapid develop of cheap and reliable energy sources, and thus exacerbating fuel poverty.

Will fracking help us to tackle climate change?

Shale gas and shale oil are fossil fuels. They emit greenhouse gases. Avoiding the worst impacts of climate change means getting off fossil fuels as soon as possible.

Scientists agree that to stop dangerous climate change, 80% of fossil fuels that we know about need to stay in the ground.

Setting up a whole new fossil fuel industry is going in completely the wrong direction, if the UK is to do its fair share to stop climate change.

The hypothesis is that global emissions lead to higher levels of greenhouse gases. In respect of CO2 this is clear. But the evidence that accelerating rate of rise in CO2 levels has led to accelerating average global temperatures is strongly contradicted by real world data. There is no scientific consensus that contracts this conclusion. Further there is no proper scientific evidence to suggest that climate is changing for the worse, if you look at the actual data, like leading climate scientist Dr John Christy does in this lecture. But even if the catastrophic global warming hypothesis were true (despite the weight of real world data against it) global warming is global. Britain is currently emitting about 1.1% of global emissions. Even with all the recently discovered shale gas and oil deposits, under the UK is probably less than 1% of all estimated fossil fuel deposits. Keeping the fossil fuels under British soil in the ground will do nothing to change the global emissions situation.  Britain tried to lead the way with the Climate Change Act of 2008, in committing to reduce its emissions by 80% by 2050. The INDC submissions leading up to COP21 Paris in December 2015 clearly showed that the rest of the countries were collectively not following that lead. The UNFCCC produced a graph showing the difference of the vague policy proposals might make.  I have stuck on the approximate emissions pathway to which the UK is committed.

The FoE is basically objecting to fracking to keep up the appearance that the UK is “doing its bit” to save the world from catastrophic global warming. But in the real world, global warming ain’t happening, neither are the predicted catastrophes. Even if it were, whatever Britain does will make no difference. FoE attempting to deny future jobs growth and stop the alleviation of fuel poverty to maintain the fantasy that Britain is leading the way on climate change.


Isn’t it better to have our own gas rather than importing it?


If we went all out for shale, our gas imports would stay at current levels as the North Sea supply declines – and imports could increase by 11%.

This claim, without any reference, is based likely based on the same out of date sources as below. If FoE and fellow-travellers kept out of the way with their erroneous then shale gas has a huge potential to cause imports to decline.

Kevin Marshall

Friends of the Earth still perverting the evidence for fracking harms

Yesterday, the Advertising Standards Authority at long last managed to informally resolve the complaints about a misleading leaflet by Friends of the Earth Trust and Friends of the Earth Ltd. This is no fault of the ASA. Rather FoE tried to defend the indefensible, drawing out the process much like they try to draw out planning inquiries. From the Guardian

“After many attempts by Friends of the Earth to delay this decision, the charity’s admission that all of the claims it made, that we complained about, were false should hopefully put a stop to it misleading the UK public on fracking,” said Francis Egan, chief executive of Cuadrilla. …..

According to the BBC

Friends of the Earth (FOE) must not repeat misleading claims it made in an anti-fracking leaflet, the advertising watchdog has said.

The fundraising flyer claimed fracking chemicals could pollute drinking water and cause cancer and implied the process increases rates of asthma.

The charity “agreed not to repeat the claims,” the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) said.

All pretty clear. As the BBC reports that the eco-worriers are not to be told that they are misleading the public.

Donna Hume, a campaigner for the environmental charity, said it would “continue to campaign against fracking” because it was “inherently risky for the environment”.


Ms Hume said Cuadrilla “started this process to distract from the real issues about fracking” and was trying to “shut down opposition”.

“It hasn’t worked though. What’s happened instead is that the ASA has dropped the case without ruling,” she said.

“We continue to campaign against fracking, alongside local people, because the process of exploring for and extracting shale gas is inherently risky for the environment, this is why fracking is banned or put on hold in so many countries.”

Donna Hume was just acting as mouthpiece to the FoE, who issued a misleading statement about the case. They stated

Last year fracking company Cuadrilla complained to the Advertising Standards Authority about one of our anti fracking leaflets.

But after more than a year, the complaint has been closed without a ruling.

The scientific evidence that fracking can cause harm to people and the environment keeps stacking up. Friends of the Earth is not alone in pointing out the risks of fracking, to the climate, to public health, of water contamination, and to the natural environment.

ASA Chief Executive Guy Parker, took the unusual step of setting the record straight.

But amidst the reports, the public comments by the parties involved and the social media chatter, there’s a risk that the facts become obscured.

So let me be clear. We told Friends of the Earth that based on the evidence we’d seen, claims it made in its anti-fracking leaflet or claims with the same meaning cannot be repeated, and asked for an assurance that they wouldn’t be. Friends of the Earth gave us an assurance to that effect. Unless the evidence changes, that means it mustn’t repeat in ads claims about the effects of fracking on the health of local populations, drinking water or property prices.

Friends of the Earth has said we “dropped the case”. That’s not an accurate reflection of what’s happened. We thoroughly investigated the complaints we received and closed the case on receipt of the above assurance. Because of that, we decided against publishing a formal ruling, but plainly that’s not the same thing as “dropping the case”. Crucially, the claims under the microscope mustn’t reappear in ads, unless the evidence changes. Dropped cases don’t have that outcome.

The ASA, which tries to be impartial and objective, had to take the unusual statement to combat FoE deliberate misinformation. So what is the scientific evidence that FoE claim? This from the false statement that ASA was forced to rebut.

The risks of fracking

In April 2016, a major peer-reviewed study by research institute PSE Healthy Energy was published in academic journal PLOS ONE, which assessed 685 pieces of peer-reviewed scientific literature from around the world over 2009-2015 and found:

  • “84% of public health studies contain findings that indicate public health hazards, elevated risks, or adverse health outcomes”

  • “69% of water quality studies contain findings that indicate potential, positive association, or actual incidence of water contamination”

  • “87% of air quality studies contain findings that indicate elevated air pollutant emissions and/or atmospheric concentrations”

I suggest readers actually read what is said. Hundreds of studies cannot identify, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is a significant large risk to human health. If any single study did establish this it would be world news. It is just hearsay, that would be dismissed by a criminal court in the UK. A suggestion is from what the  PLOS-ONE Journal does not include in the submission criteria, that is normal in traditional journals – that submissions should have something novel to say about the subject area. As an online journal it does not have to pay its way by subscriptions, as authors usually have to pay a fee of $1495 prior to publication.

But this still leaves the biggest piece of misinformation that FoE harps on about, but was not included in the ruling. Below is the BBC’s two pictures of the leaflet.



It is the the issue of climate change that goes unchallenged. Yet it is the most pernicious and misleading claim of the lot. If fracking goes ahead in the UK it will make not a jot of difference. According to the EU EDGAR data the UK emitted just 1.1% of global GHG emissions in 2012. That proportion is falling principally because emissions are rising in other countries. It will continue to fall as emissions in developing countries rise, as those countries develop. That is China, India, the rest of South East Asia and 50+ African nations. These developing countries, which are exempt from any obligation to constrain emissions under the 1992 Rio Declaration, have 80% of the global population and accounted for over 100% of emissions growth between 1990 and 2012. I have summarized the EDGAR data below.


So who does the FoE speak for when they say “We could trigger catastrophic global temperature increases if we burn shale in addition to other fossil fuels“?

They do not speak for the USA, where shale gas has replaced coal, and where total emissions have reduced as a result, with real pollutants falling. There the bonus has been hundreds of thousands of extra jobs. They do not speak for China where half of the global increase (well 53%) in GHG emissions between 1990 and 2012 occurred. They cannot speak for Britain, as if it triggers massive falls in energy costs like in the USA (and geologically the North of England Bowland shale deposits look to be much deeper than the US deposits, so potentially cheaper to extract) then industry could be attracted back to the UK from countries like China with much higher emissions per unit of output.

Even worse, F0E do not speak for the British people. In promoting renewables, they are encouraging higher energy prices, which have lead to increasing fuel poverty and increased winter deaths among the elderly. On the other hand the claims of climate catastrophism from human emissions look to be far fetched when this century global average temperature rises have stalled, when according to theory they should have increased at an accelerated rate.

Kevin Marshall

Update 7th Jan 11am

Ron Clutz has posted a good summary of the initial ruling, along with pointing to a blog run by retired minister Rev. Michael Roberts, who was one of the two private individuals (along with gas exploration company Cuadrilla) who made the complaint to ASA.

The Rev Roberts has a very detailed post on the 4th January giving extensive background history of FoE’s misinformation campaign against shale gas exploration in the Fylde. There is one link I think they should amend. The post finishes with what I believe to be a true statement.

Leaflet omits main reason for opposition is Climate change


The link is just to a series of posts on fracking in Lancashire. It is one of them is

Lancashire fracking inquiry: 3 reasons fracking must be stopped

The first reason is climate change. But rather than relate emissions to catastrophic global warming, they point to the how allowing development of fossil fuels appears in relation to Government commitments made in the Climate Change Act 2008 and the Paris Agreement. FoE presents their unbalanced case in much fuller detail in the mis-named Fracking Facts.

Update 2 7th Jan 2pm

I have rechecked the post Cuadrilla’s leaflet complaint is closed without a ruling, while evidence of fracking risks grows, where Friends of the Earth activist Tony Bosworth makes the grossly misleading statement that ASA closed the case without a ruling. The claim is still there, but no acknowledgement of the undertaking that F0E made to ASA. F0E mislead the public in order to gain donations, and now tries to hide the information from its supporters by misinformation. Below, is a screenshot of the beginning of the article.

Climate Experts Attacking a Journalist by Misinformation on Global Warming


Journalist David Rose was attacked for pointing out in a Daily Mail article that the strong El Nino event, that resulted in record temperatures, was reversing rapidly. He claimed record highs may be not down to human emissions. The Climate Feedback attack article claimed that the El Nino event did not affect the long-term human-caused trend. My analysis shows

  • CO2 levels have been rising at increasing rates since 1950.
  • In theory this should translate in warming at increasing rates. That is a non-linear warming rate.
  • HADCRUT4 temperature data shows warming stopped in 2002, only resuming with the El Nino event in 2015 and 2016.
  • At the central climate sensitivity estimate of doubling of CO2 leads to 3C of global warming, HADCRUT4 was already falling short of theoretical warming in 2000. This is without the impact of other greenhouse gases.
  • Putting a linear trend lines through the last 35 to 65 years of data will show very little impact of El Nino, but has a very large visual impact on the divergence between theoretical human-caused warming and the temperature data. It reduces the apparent impact of the divergence between theory and data, but does not eliminate it.

Claiming that the large El Nino does not affect long-term linear trends is correct. But a linear trend neither describes warming in theory or in the leading temperature set. To say, as experts in their field, that the long-term warming trend is even principally human-caused needs a lot of circumspection. This is lacking in the attack article.



Journalist David Rose recently wrote a couple of articles in the Daily Mail on the plummeting global average temperatures.
The first on 26th November was under the headline

Stunning new data indicates El Nino drove record highs in global temperatures suggesting rise may not be down to man-made emissions

With the summary

• Global average temperatures over land have plummeted by more than 1C
• Comes amid mounting evidence run of record temperatures about to end
• The fall, revealed by Nasa satellites, has been caused by the end of El Nino

Rose’s second article used the Met Offices’ HADCRUT4 data set, whereas the first used satellite data. Rose was a little more circumspect when he said.

El Nino is not caused by greenhouse gases and has nothing to do with climate change. It is true that the massive 2015-16 El Nino – probably the strongest ever seen – took place against a steady warming trend, most of which scientists believe has been caused by human emissions.

But when El Nino was triggering new records earlier this year, some downplayed its effects. For example, the Met Office said it contributed ‘only a few hundredths of a degree’ to the record heat. The size of the current fall suggests that this minimised its impact.

There was a massive reaction to the first article, as discussed by Jaime Jessop at Cliscep. She particularly noted that earlier in the year there were articles on the dramatically higher temperature record of 2015, such as in a Guardian article in January.There was also a follow-up video conversation between David Rose and Dr David Whitehouse of the GWPF commenting on the reactions. One key feature of the reactions was claiming the contribution to global warming trend of the El Nino effect was just a few hundredths of a degree. I find particularly interesting the Climate Feedback article, as it emphasizes trend over short-run blips. Some examples

Zeke Hausfather, Research Scientist, Berkeley Earth:
In reality, 2014, 2015, and 2016 have been the three warmest years on record not just because of a large El Niño, but primarily because of a long-term warming trend driven by human emissions of greenhouse gases.

Kyle Armour, Assistant Professor, University of Washington:
It is well known that global temperature falls after receiving a temporary boost from El Niño. The author cherry-picks the slight cooling at the end of the current El Niño to suggest that the long-term global warming trend has ended. It has not.

1.Recent record global surface temperatures are primarily the result of the long-term, human-caused warming trend. A smaller boost from El Niño conditions has helped set new records in 2015 and 2016.


2. The article makes its case by relying only on cherry-picked data from specific datasets on short periods.

To understand what was said, I will try to take the broader perspective. That is to see whether the evidence points conclusively to a single long-term warming trend being primarily human caused. This will point to the real reason(or reasons) for downplaying the impact of an extreme El Nino event on record global average temperatures. There are a number of steps in this process.

Firstly to look at the data of rising CO2 levels. Secondly to relate that to predicted global average temperature rise, and then expected warming trends. Thirdly to compare those trends to global data trends using the actual estimates of HADCRUT4, taking note of the consequences of including other greenhouse gases. Fourthly to put the calculated trends in the context of the statements made above.


1. The recent data of rising CO2 levels
CO2 accounts for a significant majority of the alleged warming from increases in greenhouse gas levels. Since 1958 CO2 (when accurate measures started to be taken at Mauna Loa) levels have risen significantly. Whilst I could produce a simple graph either the CO2 level rising from 316 to 401 ppm in 2015, or the year-on-year increases CO2 rising from 0.8ppm in the 1960s to over 2ppm in in the last few years, Figure 1 is more illustrative.

CO2 is not just rising, but the rate of rise has been increasing as well, from 0.25% a year in the 1960s to over 0.50% a year in the current century.


2. Rising CO2 should be causing accelerating temperature rises

The impact of CO2 on temperatures is not linear, but is believed to approximate to a fixed temperature rise for each doubling of CO2 levels. That means if CO2 levels were rising arithmetically, the impact on the rate of warming would fall over time. If CO2 levels were rising by the same percentage amount year-on-year, then the consequential rate of warming would be constant over time.  But figure 1 shows that percentage rise in CO2 has increased over the last two-thirds of a century.  The best way to evaluate the combination of CO2 increasing at an accelerating rate and a diminishing impact of each unit rise on warming is to crunch some numbers. The central estimate used by the IPCC is that a doubling of CO2 levels will result in an eventual rise of 3C in global average temperatures. Dana1981 at Skepticalscience used a formula that produces a rise of 2.967 for any doubling. After adjusting the formula, plugging the Mauna Loa annual average CO2 levels into values in produces Figure 2.

In computing the data I estimated the level of CO2 in 1949 (based roughly on CO2 estimates from Law Dome ice core data) and then assumed a linear increased through the 1950s. Another assumption was that the full impact of the CO2 rise on temperatures would take place in the year following that rise.

The annual CO2 induced temperature change is highly variable, corresponding to the fluctuations in annual CO2 rise. The 11 year average – placed at the end of the series to give an indication of the lagged impact that CO2 is supposed to have on temperatures – shows the acceleration in the expected rate of CO2-induced warming from the acceleration in rate of increase in CO2 levels. Most critically there is some acceleration in warming around the turn of the century.

I have also included the impact of linear trend (by simply dividing the total CO2 increase in the period by the number of years) along with a steady increase of .396% a year, producing a constant rate of temperature rise.

Figure 3 puts the calculations into the context of the current issue.

This gives the expected temperature linear temperature trends from various start dates up until 2014 and 2016, assuming a one year lag in the impact of changes in CO2 levels on temperatures. These are the same sort of linear trends that the climate experts used in criticizing David Rose. The difference in warming by more two years produces very little difference – about 0.054C of temperature rise, and an increase in trend of less than 0.01 C per decade. More importantly, the rate of temperature rise from CO2 alone should be accelerating.


3. HADCRUT4 warming

How does one compare this to the actual temperature data? A major issue is that there is a very indeterminate lag between the rise in CO2 levels and the rise in average temperature. Another issue is that CO2 is not the only greenhouse gas. More minor greenhouse gases may have different patterns if increases in the last few decades. However, the change the trends of the resultant warming, but only but the impact should be additional to the warming caused by CO2. That is, in the long term, CO2 warming should account for less than the total observed.
There is no need to do actual calculations of trends from the surface temperature data. The Skeptical Science website has a trend calculator, where one can just plug in the values. Figure 4 shows an example of the graph, which shows that the dataset currently ends in an El Nino peak.

The trend results for HADCRUT4 are shown in Figure 5 for periods up to 2014 and 2016 and compared to the CO2 induced warming.

There are a number of things to observe from the trend data.

The most visual difference between the two tables is the first has a pause in global warming after 2002, whilst the second has a warming trend. This is attributable to the impact of El Nino. These experts are also right in that it makes very little difference to the long term trend. If the long term is over 40 years, then it is like adding 0.04C per century that long term trend.

But there is far more within the tables than this observations. Concentrate first on the three “Trend in °C/decade” columns. The first is of the CO2 warming impact from figure 3. For a given end year, the shorter the period the higher is the warming trend. Next to this are Skeptical Science trends for the HADCRUT4 data set. Start Year 1960 has a higher trend than Start Year 1950 and Start Year 1970 has a higher trend than Start Year 1960. But then each later Start Year has a lower trend the previous Start Years. There is one exception. The period 2010 to 2016 has a much higher trend than for any other period – a consequence of the extreme El Nino event. Excluding this there are now over three decades where the actual warming trend has been diverging from the theory.

The third of the “Trend in °C/decade” columns is simply the difference between the HADCRUT4 temperature trend and the expected trend from rising CO2 levels. If a doubling of CO2 levels did produce around 3C of warming, and other greenhouse gases were also contributing to warming then one would expect that CO2 would eventually start explaining less than the observed warming. That is the variance would be positive. But CO2 levels accelerated, actual warming stalled, increasing the negative variance.


4. Putting the claims into context

Compare David Rose

Stunning new data indicates El Nino drove record highs in global temperatures suggesting rise may not be down to man-made emissions

With Climate Feedback KEY TAKE-AWAY

1.Recent record global surface temperatures are primarily the result of the long-term, human-caused warming trend. A smaller boost from El Niño conditions has helped set new records in 2015 and 2016.

The HADCRUT4 temperature data shows that there had been no warming for over a decade, following a warming trend. This is in direct contradiction to theory which would predict that CO2-based warming would be at a higher rate than previously. Given that a record temperatures following this hiatus come as part of a naturally-occurring El Nino event it is fair to say that record highs in global temperatures ….. may not be down to man-made emissions.

The so-called long-term warming trend encompasses both the late twentieth century warming and the twenty-first century hiatus. As the later flatly contradicts theory it is incorrect to describe the long-term warming trend as “human-caused”. There needs to be a more circumspect description, such as the vast majority of academics working in climate-related areas believe that the long-term (last 50+ years) warming  is mostly “human-caused”. This would be in line with the first bullet point from the UNIPCC AR5 WG1 SPM section D3:-

It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.

When the IPCC’s summary opinion, and the actual data are taken into account Zeke Hausfather’s comment that the records “are primarily because of a long-term warming trend driven by human emissions of greenhouse gases” is dogmatic.

Now consider what David Rose said in the second article

El Nino is not caused by greenhouse gases and has nothing to do with climate change. It is true that the massive 2015-16 El Nino – probably the strongest ever seen – took place against a steady warming trend, most of which scientists believe has been caused by human emissions.

Compare this to Kyle Armour’s statement about the first article.

It is well known that global temperature falls after receiving a temporary boost from El Niño. The author cherry-picks the slight cooling at the end of the current El Niño to suggest that the long-term global warming trend has ended. It has not.

This time Rose seems to have responded to the pressure by stating that there is a long-term warming trend, despite the data clearly showing that this is untrue, except in the vaguest sense. There data does not show a single warming trend. Going back to the skeptical science trends we can break down the data from 1950 into four periods.

1950-1976 -0.014 ±0.072 °C/decade (2σ)

1976-2002 0.180 ±0.068 °C/decade (2σ)

2002-2014 -0.014 ±0.166 °C/decade (2σ)

2014-2016 1.889 ±1.882 °C/decade (2σ)

There was warming for about a quarter of a century sandwiched between two periods of no warming. At the end is an uptick. Only very loosely can anyone speak of a long-term warming trend in the data. But basic theory hypotheses a continuous, non-linear, warming trend. Journalists can be excused failing to make the distinctions. As non-experts they will reference opinion that appears sensibly expressed, especially when the alleged experts in the field are united in using such language. But those in academia, who should have a demonstrable understanding of theory and data, should be more circumspect in their statements when speaking as experts in their field. (Kyle Armour’s comment is an extreme example of what happens when academics completely suspend drawing on their expertise.)  This is particularly true when there are strong divergences between the theory and the data. The consequence is plain to see. Expert academic opinion tries to bring the real world into line with the theory by authoritative but banal statements about trends.

Kevin Marshall

Climate Interactive’s Bogus INDC Forecast


Joe Romm wrote a post in early November claiming UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres had misled the public in claiming that the “INDCs have the capability of limiting the forecast temperature rise to around 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100”. Using Climate Interactive’s figures Romm claims the correct figure is 3.5°C. That Romm had one of two sources of the 2.7°C staring at him is a side issue. The major question is how Climate Interactive can achieve a full 1.0°C reduction in expected temperature rise in 2100 and a reduction of 40% in 2100 GHG emissions from pledges covering the period 2015, when the UNFCCC estimates will have a much smaller impact in 2030? Looking at the CO2 emissions, which account for 75-80% of GHG emissions, I have found the majority answer. For OECD countries where emissions per capita have been stable or falling for decades, the “No Action” scenario forecasts that they will rise for decades. For Russia and China, where per capita emissions are likely to peak before 2030 without any policy action, the “No Action” scenario forecasts that they will rise for decades. This is largely offset by Climate Interactive assuming that both emissions and economic growth in India and Africa (where there are no real attempts to control emissions) will stagnate in the coming decades. Just by making more reasonable CO2 emissions forecasts for the OECD, Russia and China can account for half of the claimed 2100 reduction in GHG emissions from the INDC. Climate Interactive’s “No Action” scenario is bogus.


Joe Romm’s use of the Climate Interactive projection

A couple of months ago, prior to the COP21 Paris climate talks, Joe Romm at Climate Progress criticized the claim made in a press release by UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres:

The INDCs have the capability of limiting the forecast temperature rise to around 2.7 degrees Celsius by 2100, by no means enough but a lot lower than the estimated four, five, or more degrees of warming projected by many prior to the INDCs

Romm’s note to the media is

If countries go no further than their current global climate pledges, the earth will warm a total of 3.5°C by 2100.

At a basic level Romm should have done some proper research. As I found out, there are two sources of the claim that are tucked away at the end of a technical appendix to the UNFCCC Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs. One of these is Climate Action Tracker. On their home page they have a little thermometer which shows the 2.7°C figure. Romm would have seen this, as he refers in the text to CAT’s page on China. The significance may not have registered.

However, the purpose of this post is not to criticize Romm, but the Climate Interactive analysis that Romm uses as the basis of his analysis. Is the Climate Interactive Graph (reproduced in Figure 1) a reasonable estimate of the impact of the INDC submissions (policy pledges) on global emissions?1

Figure 1. Climate Interactive’s graph of impact of the INDC submissions to 2100

What struck me as odd when I first saw this graph was how the INDCs could make such a large impact beyond the 2015-2030 timeframe that they covered when the overall impact was fairly marginal within that timeframe. This initial impression is confirmed by the UNFCCC’s estimate of the INDCs

Figure 2. UNFCCC’s estimate of emissions impact of the INDCs, with the impact shown by the yellow bars. Original here.

There are two things that do not stack up. First is that the “No Action” scenario appears to be a fairly reasonable extrapolation of future emissions without policy. Second, and contrary to that is the first, is that the “Current INDCs” scenario does not make sense in terms of what I have read in the INDCs and is confirmed by the INDCs. To resolve this requires looking at the makeup of the “No Action” scenario. Climate Interactive usefully provide the model for others to do their own estimates,2 With the “User Reference Scenario” giving the “no action” data3, split by type of greenhouse gas and into twenty regions or countries. As about 75-80% of emissions with the model are CO2 Fossil Fuel emissions, I will just look at this area. For simplicity I have also reduced the twenty regions or countries into just seven. That is USA, Other OECD, Russia, China, India, Africa and Rest of the World. There are also lots of ways to look at the data, but some give better understanding of the data than others. Climate Interactive also have population estimates. Population changes over a long period can themselves result in changed emissions, so looking at emissions per capita gives a better sense of the reasonableness of the forecast. I have graphed the areas in figure 3 for the historical period 1970-2010 and the forecast period 2020-2100.

Figure 3 : Fossil Fuel Emissions per capita for six regions from the Climate Interactive “No Action” Scenario.

Understanding the CO2 emissions forecasts

In the USA, emissions per capita peaked at the time of 1973 oil embargo. Since then they have declined slightly. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, higher oil prices gave the economic incentives to be more efficient in usage of oil. In cars there have been massive improvements in fuel efficiency since that time. Industry has also used energy more efficiently. Second, there has been a growth in the use of nuclear power for strategic reasons more than economic. Third is that some of the most energy intensive industries have shifted to other countries, particularly steel and chemicals. Fourth, is that growth in developed countries is mostly in the service sector, whereas growth in developing countries is mostly in manufacturing. Manufacturing tends to have much higher energy usage per unit of output than services. Fifth, is that domestic energy usage is from cars and power for the home. In an emerging economy energy usage will rise rapidly as a larger proportion of the population acquire cars and full heating and lighting systems in the home. Growth is much slower once most households have these luxuries. Sixth is that in the near future emissions might continue to fall with the development of shale gas, with its lower emissions per unit of power than from coal.

I therefore cannot understand why anyone would forecast increasing emissions per capita in the near future, when they have been stable or falling in for decades. Will everyone start to switch to less efficient cars? When these forecasts were made oil was at $100 a barrel levels, and many thought peak oil was upon us. Would private sector companies abandon more efficient energy usage for less efficient and higher cost usage? The USA may abandon nuclear power and shift back to coal for political reasons. But in all forms of energy, production and distribution is likely to continue to become more efficient in all forms.

In the rest of the OECD, there are similar patterns. In Europe energy usage was never as high. In some countries without policy CO2 emissions may rise slightly. In Germany they are replacing nuclear power stations with coal for instance. But market incentives will increase energy efficiency and manufacturing will continue to shift to emerging nations. Again, there appears no reason for a steady increase in emissions per capita to increase in the future.

Russia has a slightly different recent past. Communist central planning was highly inefficient and lead to hugely inefficient energy usage. With the collapse of communism, energy usage fell dramatically. Since then emissions have been increasing, but more slowly than the economy as a whole. Emissions will peak again in a couple of decades. This will likely be at a lower level than in the USA in 1970, despite the harsher climate, as Russia will benefit from technological advances in the intervening period. There is no reason for emissions to go on increasing at such a rapid rate.4

China has recently had phenomenal growth rates. According to UN data, from 1990 to 2012, economic growth averaged 10.3% per annum and CO2 emissions 6.1%. In the not too distant future economic growth will slow as per capita income approaches rich country levels, and emissions growth will slow or peak. But the Climate Interactive forecast has total emissions only peaking in 2090. The reason for China’s and Russia’s forecast per capita emissions exceeding those of the USA is likely due to a failure to allow for population changes. In USA population is forecast to grow, whilst in China and Russia population is forecast to fall.

India has the opposite picture. In recently years economic and CO2 emissions growth has taken off. Current policies of Prime Minister Narendra Modi are to accelerate these growth rates. But in the Climate Interactive forecast growth, economic growth and CO2 emissions growth plummet in the near future. Economic growth is already wrong. I am writing on 30/12/15. To meet the growth forecast for 2010-2015, India’s GDP will need to drop by 20% in the next 24 hours.5

For the continent of Africa, there have been encouraging growth signs in the last few years, after decades when many countries saw stagnation or even shrinking economies. Climate Interative forecasts similar growth to India, but with a forecasts of rapid population growth, the emissions per capita will hardly move.

Revised CO2 emissions forecasts

It is extremely difficult and time consuming to make more accurate CO2 emissions forecasts. As a shortcut, I will look at the impact of revisions on 2100, then at the impact on the effect of the INDCs. This is laid out in Figure 4

Figure 4 : Revised Forecast CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuels

The first three columns in pale lilac are for CO2 emissions per capita calculated, from the Climate Interactive data. In the 2100 Revised column are more realistic estimates for reasons discussed in the text. In the orange part of the table are the total forecast 2100 Climate Interactive figures for population and CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. In darker orange is the revised emissions forecast (emissions per capita multiplied by forecast population) and the impact of the revision. Overall the forecast is 10.2GtCO2e lower, as no calculation has been made for the rest of the world. To balance back requires emissions of 11.89 tonnes per capita for 2.9 billion people. As ROW includes such countries as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Iran, Vietnam, Brazil and Argentina this figure might be unreasonable 85 years from now.

The revised impact on the INDC submissions

The INDC submissions can be broken down.

The USA, EU, Japan and Australia all have varying levels of cuts to total emissions. So for the OECD as a whole I estimate Climate Interactive over estimates the impact of the INDCs by 8.4GtCO2e

The Russian INDC pledge it is unclear, but it seems to be saying that emissions will peak before 2030 at below 1990 levels6. As my revised forecast is above this level, I estimate Climate Interactive over estimates the impact of the INDCs by 3.2GtCO2e

The Chinese INDC claims pledges that its emissions will have peaked by 2030. This will have happened anyway and at around 10-12 tonnes per capita. I have therefore assumed that emissions will stay constant from 2030 to 2100 whilst the population is falling. Therefore I estimate that Climate Interactive over estimates the impact of the INDCs by 19.5GtCO2e

Overall for these areas the overestimation is around 31 GtCO2e. Instead of 63.5GtCO2e forecast for these countries for 2100 it should be nearer 32.5GtCO2e. This is about half the total 2100 reduction that Climate Interactive claims that the INDC submission will make from all types of greenhouse gases. A more rigorous forecast may have lower per capita emissions in the OECD and China. There may be other countries where similar forecast issues of CO2 emissions might apply. In addition, in note 7 I briefly look at the “No Action” CH4 emissions, the second largest greenhouse gas. There appear to be similar forecast issued there.

In summary, the make-up of the CO2 emissions “No Action” forecast is bogus. It deviates from an objective and professional forecast in a way that grossly exaggerates the impact of any actions to control GHG emissions, or even pledges that constitute nothing more than saying what would happen anyway.


  1. The conversion of a given quantity of emissions into average surface temperature changes is outside the scope of this article. Also we will assume that all policy pledges will be fully implemented.
  2. On the Home page use the menu for Tools/C-ROADS. Then on the right hand side select “Download C-ROADS”. Install the software. Run the software. Click on “Create New Run” in the centre of the screen.

    This will generate a spreadsheet “User Scenario v3 026.xls”. The figures I use are in the User Reference Scenario tab. The software version I am working from is v4.026v.071.

  3. The “User Reference Scenario” is claimed to be RCP 8.5. I may post at another time on my reconciliation between the original and the Climate Interactive versions.
  4. The forecast estimates for economic growth and emissions for Russia look quite bizarre when the 5 year percentage changes are graphed.

    I cannot see any reason for growth rates to fall to 1% p.a in the long term. But this is the situation with most others areas as well. Nor can I think of a reason for emissions growth rates to increase from 2030 to 2055, or after 2075 expect as a contrivance for consistency purposes.

  5. The forecast estimates for economic growth and emissions for India look even more bizarre than for Russia when the 5 year percentage changes are graphed.

    I am writing on 30/12/15. To meet the growth forecast for 2010-2015, India’s GDP will need to drop by 20% in the next 24 hours. From 2015 to 2030, the period of the INDC submissions, CO2 emissions are forecast to grow by 8.4%. India’s INDC submission implies GHG emissions growth from 2014 to 2030 of 90% to 100%. Beyond that India is forecast to stagnate to EU growth rates, despite being a lower to middle income country. Also, quite contrary to Russia, emissions growth rates are always lower than economic growth rates.

  6. The Russian Federation INDC states

    Limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gases in Russia to 70-75% of 1990 levels by the year 2030 might be a long-term indicator, subject to the maximum possible account of absorbing capacity of forests.

    This appears as ambiguous, but could be taken as meaning a long term maximum.

  7. CH4 (Methane) emissions per Capita

    I have quickly done a similar analysis of methane emissions per capita as in Figure 2 for CO2 emissions. The scale this time is in kilos, not tonnes.

    There are similarities

  • OECD emissions had been falling but are forecast to rise. The rise is not as great as for CO2.
  • In Russia and China emissions are forecast to rise. In Russia this is by a greater amount than for CO2, in China by a lesser amount.
  • In Africa, per capita emissions are forecast to fall slightly. Between 2010, CH4 emissions are forecast to rise 3.1 times and population by 4.3 times.
  • In both the USA and Other OECD (a composite of CI’s categories) total CH4 emissions are forecast in 2100 to be 2.778 times higher than in 2010. In both China and India total CH4 emissions are forecast in 2100 to be 2.420 times higher than in 2010.

Lomborg and the Grantham Institute on the INDC submissions

Bjorn Lomborg has a new paper published in the Global Policy journal, titled: Impact of Current Climate Proposals. (hattip Bishop Hill and WUWT)

From the Abstract

This article investigates the temperature reduction impact of major climate policy proposals implemented by 2030, using the standard MAGICC climate model. Even optimistically assuming that promised emission cuts are maintained throughout the century, the impacts are generally small. ………… All climate policies by the US, China, the EU and the rest of the world, implemented from the early 2000s to 2030 and sustained through the century will likely reduce global temperature rise about 0.17°C in 2100. These impact estimates are robust to different calibrations of climate sensitivity, carbon cycling and different climate scenarios. Current climate policy promises will do little to stabilize the climate and their impact will be undetectable for many decades.

That is pretty clear. COP21 in Paris is a waste of time.

An alternative estimate is provided in a paper by Boyd, Turner and Ward (BTW) of the LSE Grantham Institute, published at the end of October.

They state

The most optimistic estimate of global emissions in 2030 resulting from the INDCs is about halfway between hypothetical ‘business as usual’ and a pathway that is consistent with the 2°C limit

The MAGICC climate model used by both Lomborg & the IPCC predicts warming of about 4.7°C under BAU, implying up to a 1.35°C difference from the INDCs, compared to the 0.17°C maximum calculated by Lomborg, 8 times the amount. Lomborg says this is contingent on no carbon leakage (exporting industry from policy to non-policy countries), whilst citing studies showing that it could offset 10-40%, or even over 100% of the emissions reduction. So the difference between sceptic Lomborg and the mighty LSE Grantham Institute is even greater than 8 times. Yet Lomborg refers extensively to the August Edition of BTW. So why the difference? There is no explicit indication in BTW of how they arrive at their halfway conclusion. nor a comparison by Lomborg.

Two other estimates are from the UNFCCC, and Climate Action Tracker. Both estimate the INDCs will constrain warming to 2.7°C, or about 2.0°C below the MAGICC BAU scenario. They both make assumptions about massive reductions in emissions post 2030 that are not in the INDCs. But at least the UNFCCC and CAT have graphs that show the projection through to 2100. Not so with BTW.

This is where the eminent brain surgeons and Nobel-Prize winning rocket scientists among the readership will need to concentrate to achieve the penetrating analytical powers of a lesser climate scientist.

From the text of BTW, the hypothetical business as usual (BAU) scenario for 2030 is 68 GtCO2e. The most optimistic scenario for emissions from the INDCs (and pessimistic for economic growth in the emerging economies) us that 2030 emissions will be 52 GtCO2e. The sophisticated climate projection models have whispered in code to the climate scientists that to be on target for the limit of 2.0°C, 2030 emissions show be not more than 36 GtCO2e. The mathematicians will be able to determine that 52 is exactly halfway between 36 and 68.

Now for the really difficult bit. I have just spent the last half hour in the shed manically cranking the handle of my patent beancounter extrapolator machine to get this result. By extrapolating this halfway result for the forecast period 2010-2030 through to 2100 my extrapolator tells me the INDCs are halfway to reaching the 2.0°C maximum warming target.

As Bob Ward will no doubt point out in his forthcoming rebuttal of Bjorn Lomborg’s paper, it is only true climate scientists who can reach such levels of analysis and understanding.

I accept no liability for any injuries caused, whether physical or psychological, by people foolishly trying to replicate this advanced result. Please leave this to the experts.

But there is a serious side to this policy advocacy. The Grantham Institute, along with others, is utterly misrepresenting the effectiveness of policy to virtually every government on the planet. Lomborg shows by rigorous means that policy is ineffective even if loads of ridiculous assumptions are made, whether on climate science forecasting, policy theory, technological solutions, government priorities, or the ability of  current governments to make policy commitments for governments for decades ahead. My prediction is that the reaction of the Grantham Institute, along with plenty of others, is a thuggish denunciation of Lomborg. What they will not consider is the rational response to wide differences of interpretation. That is to compare and contrast the arguments and the assumptions made, both explicit and implicit. 

Kevin Marshall

Indonesia Outflanks the Climate Activists in its INDC Submission

I have spent a few weeks trying to make sense of the INDC submissions. One of the most impenetrable appeared to that from Indonesia. This view is shared by The Carbon Brief.

Uncertain emissions

As well as being hazy on policy and financing needs, it is also difficult to gauge the ambition of Indonesia’s INDC emissions targets. This is despite the document including a projected figure for BAU emissions in 2030 of 2.9bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e).

The pledge to reduce emissions by at least 29% compared to this trajectory means an effective cap in 2030 of 2GtCO2e. With the more ambitious 41% reduction compared to BAU, the cap would be 1.7GtCO2e.


Similarly the World Resources Institute states

(T)he current draft contribution still displays several important gaps in transparency and ambition, which must be addressed before submitting a final INDC to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). By eliminating these gaps, the Indonesian government could bring its contribution into line with international best practices on transparency, demonstrate leadership internationally by enhancing ambition, and help ensure success at COP 21.

The context from Indonesia’s perspective is stated in the opening paragraph of Indonesia’s INDC Submission.

In more basic language, Indonesia has more important and immediate priorities than “climate change“. From a national point of view, imposing drastic and ineffective policies will go against the Indonesian Government’s perceived duty to its people. This will happen regardless of the truth of the projected catastrophes that await the planet without global mitigation. The policies will be ineffective because most other emerging economies have similar priorities to Indonesia, and are taking similar measures of policy avoidance. In the case of Indonesia these are

  • Cherry-picking a base year.
  • Making reductions relative to a fictional “Business as Usual” scenario with inflated economic growth figures.
  • Making sure that even the most ambitious objectives achievable within the range of an objective forecast.
  • Focus the negotiations on achieving the conditional objectives subject to outside assistance. Any failure to reach agreement then becomes the fault of rich countries failing to provide the finance.
  • Allow some room to make last minute concessions not in the original submission, contingent on further unspecified outside assistance that is so vast the money will never be forthcoming.

The calculations to achieve the figures in the submissions are fairly simple to work out with a bit of patience.


Calculating the 2030 Business as Usual 2881 MtCO2e

The Indonesian INDC submission states that in 2005 total emissions were 1800 MtCO2e and combustion of fossil fuels were 19% of this total. That implies about 342 MtCO2e from the combustion of fossil fuels. The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC1) has an estimated figure of 341.71 MtCO2e and the UNFCCC Country Brief in 2005 “CO2 emissions from fuel combustion” were 335.71 MtCO2e. For 20112 the CDIAC estimate is 472.53 MtCO2e, rounded to 473. Let us now assume a growth rate in emissions of 6.0% per annum from 2012 to 2030, against an economic growth rate of around 5.2% from 2000 to 2010 and 5.8% from 2005 to 20103. At 6.0% compound growth fossil fuel emissions in 20304 will be 1431 MtCO2e.

The non-fossil fuel emissions are a bit more problematic to work out. In 2005 the baseline estimate is 81% of 18005 is 1458. It is only a vague estimate, so round it down to 1450 and then assume it is constant for the Business as Usual (BAU) scenario.

The BAU 2030 total emissions forecast for Indonesia is therefore 1431 + 1450 = 2881 MtCO2e.

There might be other ways to derive this figure, but none are simpler and the figures do not fall out exactly.


How does Indonesia achieve the unconditional 29% reduction against BAU?

The easiest part to achieve is outside of fossil fuel emissions. The major cause of these emissions is in the reduction of the rainforests. The Carbon Brief is claims the biggest source of non-fossil fuel emissions is due to illegal forest clearances to grow palm oil. Although in 2015 the forest fires are closing in on the record set in 1997, it is safe to say that that these will reduce considerably in the coming years as Indonesia already has 52% of world palm oil production. By assuming a 3.34% reduction per annum in these emissions from 2005, they will reduce from 1450 MtCO2e to 611 MtCO2e in 2030. Total emissions of 2042 MtCO2e (1431+611) are 29.1% lower than BAU without an expense on the part of the Indonesian Government.


How does Indonesia achieve the conditional 41% reduction against BAU?

Indonesia claims that it needs international cooperation increase the reduction against BAU to 41%. In whole numbers, if BAU is 2881 a 41% reduction would make 1700. Not 1699 or 1701, but 1700. This is 100 less than the estimated 1800 MtCO2e total GHG emissions for 2005. This will be achieved without any “international cooperation“, a euphemism for foreign aid. The reason is simple. From the UNFCCC Indonesia Country Brief for Indonesia GDP growth for 1990 to 2012 average GDP growth per annum was 4.9% and CO2 emissions from fuel combustion was 5.1%. Normally GDP growth exceeds emissions growth. As a country develops this gap will widen until emissions growth ceases altogether and will even fall slightly. In India GDP growth from 1990 to 2012 averaged 6.5% and emissions growth was 5.7%. In China the respective figures are 10.3% and 6.1%. In China, emissions will peak around 2025 to 2030 without any policy change. It is reasonable to assume therefore that forecast fossil fuel emissions growth will be at a lower rate than the forecast GDP growth of 6.0%. A conservative estimate is that the fossil fuel emissions growth rate will be 25% lower than GDP growth rate from 2011 to 2030 at 4.50%. Rounding as before4 gives forecast emissions of 1089 MtCO2e as against a BAU of 1431.

The revised 2030 total emissions forecast for Indonesia is 1089 + 611 = 1700 MtCO2e. This is a 41.0% reduction on the BAU of 2881 MtCO2e.


Why should Indonesia have such a cynical manipulation of the numbers?

Indonesia is caught between a rock and a hard place. The stated major priorities for this country of 250 million people are at odds with doing its bit to save the world. In this Indonesia is not alone. India, China, and Vietnam are other major emerging nations who site other priorities. Ranged against them are the activist scientists behind the climate scare who hold the a priori truth of the prophesied global warming catastrophes that await the planet if we do not amend out wicked ways. Further, mitigation policies are good for the sole, regardless of their effectiveness, and the practice of these policies will lead others to enlightenment they have found. They will not recognize that any alternative points of view exist, whether morally, politically or scientifically. Rather than argue, the best policy is to outflank them. The activists will accept official policy objectives without question so long as it appears to fit the cause. So the Indonesians gave them massive cuts related to fictitious projected figures, cloaked with the language of climate speak to throw them off the scent. They should be applauded for protecting 250 million people, rather than inflicting ineffective burdens upon them. The real shame is that the leaders of the so-called developed economies have fallen for this rubbish.

Kevin Marshall


  1. Reference of the full global carbon budget 2014: C. Le Quéré, R. Moriarty, R. M. Andrew, G. P. Peters, P. Ciais, P. Friedlingstein, S. D. Jones, S. Sitch, P. Tans, A. Arneth, T. A. Boden, L. Bopp, Y. Bozec, J. G. Canadell, F. Chevallier, C. E. Cosca, I. Harris, M. Hoppema, R. A. Houghton, J. I. House, A. K. Jain, T. Johannessen, E. Kato, R. F. Keeling, V. Kitidis, K. Klein Goldewijk, C. Koven, C. S. Landa, P. Landschützer, A. Lenton, I. D. Lima, G. H. Marland, J. T. Mathis, N. Metzl, Y. Nojiri, A. Olsen, T. Ono, W. Peters, B. Pfeil, B. Poulter, M. R. Raupach, P. Regnier, C. Rödenbeck, S. Saito, J. E. Sailsbury, U. Schuster, J. Schwinger, R. Séférian, J. Segschneider, T. Steinhoff, B. D. Stocker, A. J. Sutton, T. Takahashi, B. Tilbrook, G. R. van der Werf, N. Viovy, Y.-P. Wang, R. Wanninkhof, A. Wiltshire, and N. Zeng 2014. Global Carbon Budget 2014. Earth System Science Data Discussions, doi:10.5194/essdd-7-521-2014
  2. 2011 is the baseline year for the IPCC reports.
  3. This can be obtained from two sources. First the INDC submission notes that “GDP Growth Rate has slowed between 2010-2015 from 6.2-6.5% per annum to only 4.0% per annum (first quarter of 2015).” A return to the higher levels of growth is an assumption of successful government policy.
  4. Each year growth of 6.0% is rounded to the nearest whole number.
  5. The 2005 total emissions estimate of 1800 MtCO2 is at odds with other estimates. The WRI CAIT 2.0 figure is 1600; the EDGAR estimate is 1171; and the UNFCCC estimate is 2828. There might be another method of estimation. Maybe it is being a bit too cynical to assume that someone could have taken the average of the three (1866) and rounded down.

Ivanpah Solar Project Still Failing to Achieve Potential

Paul Homewood yesterday referred to a Marketwatch report titled “High-tech solar projects fail to deliver.” This was reposted at Tallbloke.

Marketwatch looks at the Ivanpah solar project. They comment

The $2.2 billion Ivanpah solar power project in California’s Mojave Desert is supposed to be generating more than a million megawatt-hours of electricity each year. But 15 months after starting up, the plant is producing just 40% of that, according to data from the U.S. Energy Department.

I looked at the Ivanpah solar project last fall, when the investors applied for a $539million federal grant to help pay off a $1.5 billion federal loan. One of the largest investors was Google, who at the end of 2013 had Cash, Cash Equivalents & Marketable Securities of $58,717million, $10,000million than the year before.

Technologically the Ivanpah plant seems impressive. It is worth taking a look at the website.

That might have been the problem. The original projections were for 1065,000 MWh annually from a 392 MW nameplate implying a planned output of 31% of capacity. When I look at the costings on Which? for solar panels on the roof of a house, they assume just under 10% of capacity. Another site, Wind and Sun UK, say

1 kWp of well sited PV array in the UK will produce 700-800 kWh of electricity per year.

That is around 8-9.5% of capacity. Even considering the technological superiority of the project and the climatic differences, three times is a bit steep, although 12.5% (40% of 31%) is very low. From Marketwatch some of the difference is can be explained by

  • Complex equipment constantly breaking down
  • Optimization of complex new technologies
  • Steam pipes leaking due to vibrations
  • Generating the initial steam takes longer than expected
  • It is cloudier than expected

However, even all of this cannot account for the output only being at 40% of expected. With the strong sun of the desert I would expect daily output to never exceed 40% of theoretical, as it is only daylight for 50% of the time, and just after sunrise and before sunset the sun is less strong than at midday. As well as the teething problems with complex technology, it appears that the engineers were over optimistic. A lack of due diligence in appraising the scheme – a factor common to many large scale Government backed initiatives – will have let the engineers have the finance for a fully scaled-up version of what should have been a small-scale project to prove the technology.


Dixon and Jones confirm a result on the Stephan Lewandowsky Surveys

Congratulations to Ruth Dixon and Jonathan Jones on managing to get a commentary on the two Stephan Lewandowsky, Gilles Gignac & Klaus Oberauer surveys published in Psychological Science. Entitled “Conspiracist Ideation as a Predictor of Climate Science Rejection: An Alternative Analysis” it took two years to get published. Ruth Dixon gives a fuller description on her blog, My Garden Pond. It confirms something that I have stated independently, with the use of pivot tables instead of advanced statistical techniques. In April last year I compared the two surveys in a couple of posts – Conspiracist Ideation Falsified? (CIF) & Extreme Socialist-Environmentalist Ideation as Motivation for belief in “Climate Science” (ESEI).

The major conclusion through their analysis of the survey

All the data really shows is that people who have no opinion about one fairly technical matter (conspiracy theories) also have no opinion about another fairly technical matter (climate change). Complex models mask this obvious (and trivial) finding.

In CIF my summary was

A recent paper, based on an internet survey of American people, claimed that “conspiracist ideation, is associated with the rejection of all scientific propositions tested“. Analysis of the data reveals something quite different. Strong opinions with regard to conspiracy theories, whether for or against, suggest strong support for strongly-supported scientific hypotheses, and strong, but divided, opinions on climate science.

In the concluding comments I said

The results of the internet survey confirm something about people in the United States that I and many others have suspected – they are a substantial minority who love their conspiracy theories. For me, it seemed quite a reasonable hypothesis that these conspiracy lovers should be both suspicious of science and have a propensity to reject climate science. Analysis of the survey results has over-turned those views. Instead I propose something more mundane – that people with strong opinions in one area are very likely to have strong opinions in others. (Italics added)

Dixon and Jones have a far superior means of getting to the results. My method is to input the data into a table, find groupings or classifications, then analyse the results via pivot tables or graphs. This mostly leads up blind alleys, but can develop further ideas. For every graph or table in my posts, there can be a number of others stashed on my hard drive. To call it “trial and error” misses out the understanding to be gained from analysis. Their method (through rejecting linear OLS) is loess local regression. They derive the following plot.

This compares with my pivot table for the same data.

The shows in the Grand Total row that the strongest Climate (band 5) comprise 12% of the total responses. For the smallest group of beliefs about conspiracy theories with just 60/5005 responses, 27% had the strongest beliefs in about climate. The biggest percentage figure is the group who averaged a middle “3” score on both climate and conspiracy theories. That is those with no opinion on either subject.

The more fundamental area that I found is that in the blog survey between strong beliefs in climate science and extreme left-environmentalist political views. It is a separate topic, and its inclusion by Dixon and Jones would have both left much less space for the above insight in 1,000 words, and been much more difficult to publish. The survey data is clear.

The blog survey (which was held on strongly alarmist blogs) shows that most of the responses were highly skewed to anti-free market views (that is lower response score) along with being strongly pro-climate.

The internet survey of the US population allowed 5 responses instead of 4. The fifth was a neutral. This shows a more normal distribution of political beliefs, with over half of the responses in the middle ground.

This shows what many sceptics have long suspected, but I resisted. Belief in “climate science” is driven by leftish world views. Stephan Lewandowsky can only see the link between the “climate denial” beliefs and free-market, because he views left-environmentalist perspectives and “climate science” as a priori truths. This is the reality that everything is to be measured. From this perspective climate science has not failed due to being falsified by the evidence, but because scientists have yet to find the evidence; the models need refining; and there is a motivated PR campaign to undermine these efforts.

Kevin Marshall